Documents/NMS/3: Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attacks/3: Deterring Aggression

3: Deterring Aggression

Deterrence rests on an adversary understanding that the United States has an unquestioned ability to deny strategic objectives and to impose severe consequences in response to hostile or potentially hostile actions. Deterring aggression and coercion must be anticipatory in nature to prevent the catastrophic impact of attacks using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons on civilian population centers in the United States or in partner nations. The Armed Forces have the capability to exercise flexible deterrent options (FDOs) with appropriate combat power to defuse a crisis or force an adversary to reevaluate its courses of action. Combatant commanders build upon the capabilities of early arriving FDOs to support the swift defeat of an adversary when necessary. Moreover, they employ capabilities to establish favorable security conditions in which other, non-military FDOs can succeed. Effective deterrence requires a strategic communication plan that emphasizes the willingness of the United States to employ force in defense of its interests. Combatant commander participation is essential in developing a strategic communication plan that conveys US intent and objectives, and ensures the success of the plan by countering adversary disinformation and misinformation. Such strategic communication can help avoid conflict or deescalate tensions among adversaries. The United States requires a broad set of options to discourage aggression and coercion. Nuclear capabilities continue to play an important role in deterrence by providing military options to deter a range of threats, including the use of WMD/E and large-scale conventional forces. Additionally, the extension of a credible nuclear deterrent to allies has been an important nonproliferation tool that has removed incentives for allies to develop and deploy nuclear forces. Deterring aggression by a wider range of adversaries requires transforming existing US strategic nuclear forces into a new triad composed of a diverse portfolio of capabilities. This new model for strategic deterrence includes non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, active and passive defenses, as well as infrastructure to build and maintain the force. Improvements and enhancements to non-nuclear strike capabilities, information operations, command and control, intelligence and space forces will contribute to a more robust and effective deterrent capability. Future advances in targeting and precision will provide the capabilities necessary to defeat a wider range of targets while reducing collateral damage.

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