4: Conflict Deterrence
Deter Conflict Other Information:
Deterrence is key to preventing conflict and enhancing security. It requires influencing the political and military choices
of an adversary, dissuading it from taking an action by making its leaders understand that either the cost of the action is
too great, is of no use, or unnecessary. Deterrence also is based upon credibility: the ability to prevent attack, respond
decisively to any attack so as to discourage even contemplating an attack upon us, and strike accurately when necessary. For
nearly half a century, the United States approached its security focused on asingle end: deterring the Soviet Union from attacking
the United States and our allies in what could have escalated into a global thermonuclear catastrophe. To that purpose we
built our deterrent upon a diverse and survivable nuclear force, coupled with a potent conventional capability, designed to
counter the military power of one adversary. Likewise, our assumptions and calculations for shaping deterrence were based
largely upon our understanding of the dynamics and culture of the Soviet Union alone. All potential conflict was subsumed
and influenced by that confrontation and the fear of escalation within it. Even so, there were limits. Military capabilities
alone were, and are, no panacea to deter all conflict: despite the enormous strength of both the United States and the Soviet
Union, conflicts arose; some were defused, while others spilled over into local wars. In the contemporary strategic environment,
the challenge is one of deterring or dissuading a range of potential adversaries from taking a variety of actions against
the U.S. and our allies and interests. These adversaries could be states or non-state actors; they could use nuclear, conventional,
or unconventional weapons; and they could exploit terrorism, electronic, cyber and other forms of warfare. Economic interdependence
and the growth of global communications further complicate thesituation. Not only do they blur the types of threats, they
also exacerbate sensitivity to the effects of attacks and in some cases make it more difficult toattribute or trace them.
Finally, the number of potential adversaries, the breadth of their capabilities, and the need to design approaches to deterrence
for each, create new challenges. We must tailor deterrence to fit particular actors, situations, and forms of warfare. The
same developments that add to the complexity of the challenge also offer us a greater variety of capabilities and methods
to deter or dissuade adversaries. This diversity of tools, military and non-military, allows us to create more plausible reactions
to attacks in the eyes of opponents and a more credible deterrence to them. In addition, changes in capabilities, especially
new technologies, permit us to create increasingly credible defenses to convince would-be attackers that their efforts are
ultimately futile. Our ability to deter attack credibly also reassures the American people and ourallies of our commitment
to defend them. For this reason, deterrence must remain grounded in demonstrated military capabilities that can respond to
a broad array of challenges to international security. For example, the United States will maintain its nuclear arsenal as
a primary deterrent to nuclear attack, and the New Triad remains a cornerstone of strategic deterrence. We must also continue
to field conventional capabilities to augment or even replace nuclear weapons in order to provide our leaders a greater range
of credible responses. Missile defenses not only deter an attack, but can defend against such an attack should deterrence
fail. Precision-guided munitions allow us great flexibility not only to react to attacks,but also to strike preemptively when
necessary to defend ourselves and our allies. Yet we must also recognize that deterrence has its limits, especially where
our interests are ill-defined or the targets of our deterrence are difficult to influence. Deterrence may be impossible in
cases where the value is not in the destruction of a target, but the attack and the very means of attack, as in terrorism.
We must build both our ability to withstand attack – a fundamental and defensive aspect of deterrence – and improve our resiliency
beyond an attack. An important change in planning for the myriad of future potential threats must be post-attack recovery
and operational capacity. This, too, helps demonstrate that such attacks are futile, as does our ability to respond with strength
and effectiveness to attack. For the future, the global scope of problems, and the growing complexity ofdeterrence in new
domains of conflict, will require an integrated interagency and international approach if we are to make use of all the tools
available to us. We must consider which non-lethal actions constitute an attack on our sovereignty, and which may require
the use of force in response. We must understand thepotential for escalation from non-lethal to lethal confrontation, and
learn to calculate and manage the associated risks.
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