1: Safety Oversight
Assist DOE in improving safety at existing and proposed defense nuclear facilities by identifying health and safety issues
affecting the public and the workers, recommending actions to address these issues, and ensuring that corrective actions are
completed.
Other Information:
Interdependency of These Four Performance Goals: The interdependence of these four strategic areas of concentration must be
understood to appreciate the efficiency of the Board’s operating plan and corresponding organizational alignment. “Lessons
learned” from the Board’s health and safety oversight activities crosscut into each of these four areas. Health and safety
hazards identified in Nuclear Material Processing and Stabilization (Area 2) must be transferred to the Nuclear Weapon Operations
(Area 1) to avoid or mitigate new remediation issues before they happen. Likewise, the lessons learned from Nuclear Facilities
Design and Infrastructure (Area 3) must be shared with managers responsible for preparing and enforcing health and safety-related
guidance, requirements, and regulations in Nuclear Safety Programs and Analysis (Area 4). For example, in order to oversee
safety at the Y-12 National Security Complex, the Board must assess the safety of hazardous activities that support the nuclear
weapons stockpile (Area 1). To accomplish its general goal, the Board must also assess processing and stabilization of nuclear
materials to support facility deactivation, such as Building 9206 (Area 2), construction of new defense nuclear facilities
such as the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (Area 3), and implementation of important safety programs such as criticality
safety (Area 4). Another example of the interdependence of the four strategic areas of concentration is the safety oversight
of the Savannah River Site. At this site, the Board must evaluate not only the safety of nuclear material processing and stabilization
activities such as disposing of high level waste (Area 2), but also the safety of nuclear weapon support activities involving
tritium operations (Area 1), the construction of new defense nuclear facilities such as the Pit Disassembly and Conversion
Facility (Area 3), and nuclear safety programs such as high level waste tank integrity inspections (Area 4). As discussed
in Strategic Area 3 above, DOE is designing and constructing many new defense nuclear facilities that will be used to support
the nuclear weapon operations and/or nuclear material processing and stabilization. To ensure that DOE protects the health
and safety of the public and the workers, the Board must pay close attention to the design, construction, start-up and operation
of these facilities, as well as major modifications to existing facilities, including the selection of governing safety standards
and requirements. Equally important, the Board evaluates the directives, standards, and programs governing DOE’s safe performance
of its hazardous defense nuclear activities. The Board’s first three strategic areas of concentration heavily rely upon the
implementation of specific DOE rules and directives. The Board’s integrated, comprehensive oversight of the safety of DOE’s
defense nuclear facilities requires that the Board carefully evaluate these safety programs. The synergy gained from constant
information-sharing among the Board’s matrixed staff which supports all four strategic areas of concentration is key to achieving
the Board’s general goal.
Objective(s):
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